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Previous generations have bequealhed to us the interlocking problems ofwhich
texts to read and of how to read them. These debales in tum intersect with
those about the nature ofhistory, notably the rise of social history ... and the
relaled skepticism about the nature ofhistorical 'events' and 'facts '. The main
tendency in new historicism has bravely swept over most of these debales
without explicitly addressing the nature ofthe historicism ... that it is seeking
to restore to the reading oftexts. But it seems safe to say that the new historicists
do view their project as revitalizing the increasingly fonnalist project of
deconstruction.
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, 'Literary Criticism and the Politics of the
New Historicism', in H. Aram Veeser, ed., The New Historicism,
New York & London, 1989. p.215.
In recent decades readers of literature and criticism have become
accustomed, or perhaps merely inured, to hearing the article of faith
which proclaims that language is entirely self-referential, and that the
author of a poem or novel is not present in his work. This doctrine
would appear to be moored to the reasoning that because we perceive
the world by means of representations or signs, among which words
count and are the currency of thought, what we perceive is therefore
the representation of an object, rather than being the object itself.)
Hence our apprehension of a work of literature can include no sense
of its author's presence; for the signs which traditionally might have
conveyed a writer's meaning are now held to evince to readers only
the system of representation wherein an originating authorial intention
must instantly be dissolved.
The grounds exist, however, for arguing that the extreme anti-
subjectivity of this creed expresses at bottom an irritable dependence
upon an opposite and related series of assumptions which would
envisage works of art as an objectification of their authors' biographies:
as entities whose meanings may be determined by a critical unearthing
of events and influences, actions and intentions, in the temporal
existence of the real man or woman. One thinks here of Sir Edmund
Gosse's biography of John Donne, and his reading of the Songs and
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Sonets very much in these tenns;2 and the fact that such an approach
to poetry has not been discarded, even in these times in which Jacques
Derrida and Roland Barthes are held by some to have discovered that
the world is round, is suggested in the following piece of criticism:
Just as Donne's first, most joyful letter to Ann [More] is complicated
by wariness and uncertainty, his most exalted and exuberant poems are
constrained by secrecy and disturbed by 'true and false feares' ... In The
Sunne Rising, The Good Morrow, and The Canonization, Donne proclaims
the uniqueness of the lovers who are confined to 'one little roome', but he
also shows the limitations and worries of lovers who cannot appear
together in drawing-rooms. Because their all-encompassing, unprecedented
love is clandestine, it is always subject to the death-blow of discovery and
condemnation)
The assumptions which prompt these speculations centre very
plainly upon a sense of the creative act which equates that act with a
species of bridge to the transliteration, in a work of art, of experience.
Implicit therein is the notion of creativity as a function of the conscious
and notional will, and the corresponding concept of a poem or novel
as making immanent, rather than as transfonning or recreating, both
will and experience. But from this critic's sense of an expcrientially-
determined and basically external authorship recoverable in a poem
as a form of intentional immanence, a blue-print of Donne's volition
as it were, there is only a short road to the project to distil that sense
into a conscious and elaborated piece of theorizing wherefrom to
launch the opposite error-that of supposing that because ripples
which succeed upon the passage of a stone into still water are not
identical with the stone, nor the stone with them, there consequently
exists no basis upon which to affirm that the ripples both represent the
presence of the missile and have a signifying and evocative life of
their own. In the world summoned into being in the theories of
'deconstruction', this assumption is exhibited, insistently and as a
hallmark of ideological purity; in the assertion of the absence of any
species of lived experience in literature, and in the dogma of the
completely illusory nature of authorial presence. Thus, the failure
properly to conceive the relation between a writer and his work is in
fact a precondition for speaking of them, as in the case of Ilona Bell,
as identical, or, as in other cases, as utterly dissociated. Roland Barthes's
well-known theory as to the death of authors seems to me to depend
entirely for its point upon the barren dialectic between these
simultaneously antagonistic and interdependent notions, themselves a
reflection of that sterile complicity and animus between reaction and
62
Wanvick Orr
revolution so basic to the production of the modern world.4 At a level
considerably more significant than that attained by Barthes, Jacques
Derrida is a philosophical Jack Sprat who will have no fat where the
estranged critical wives at table with him would scem to want no lean:
for in his view, there is nothing beyond the text, or beyond language;5
and since agents are demonstrably not present in an absolute and
determining manner in speech or writing, as it were as 'transcendental
signifieds'6 ensconcing themsclves in discourse to impregnate it with
intention, they are therefore not present at alP
In a literary world too given to complacencies as to the efficacy
of a knowledge of 'conventions' to explain away works of art, and
too prone within itsclf to feeble belle-Iettrism and an inert reliance
upon the touchstone of an author's supposed intentions, the
'deconstructive' recognition, or post-Leavisian reaffirmation, of the
multiplicity of meaning, was not only appropriate, but also necessary.
That recognition, however, which was to have 'opened'S the reading
of literature, has issued instead, as if impelled from the Tennis Court
to the Jacobin Club, in the mere dread of closure; the consignment
of Authors to the tumbrels; and the elucidation of the doctrine,
analogous to that of perpetual revolution, of infinite interpretability;
which last has resulted in that doctrine's infinite (or at least
interminable) reiteration, and in a self-satisfied punctilio among critics
who imagine that actually to engage with a work of art or its
interpretation would be to reveal their fingernails as somehow less
than scrupulously cleaned and pared.9
There are signs about, however, that the 'deconstructive' enterprise
is well on the way towards the defunction to which its mentors and
their scholarly initiates had hoped to consign subjects and authors. tO
To all but its adepts, 'deconstruction's' inability to dissolve or to
suffocate the esscntial distinction between seeking to free oneself
from a thing and showing that thing to be non-existent, must reveal as
frivolously vatic, and thereby disqualify outright, its pivotal claim as
to the insuhstantiality of subjects; because the claim, though insistently
proffered, has never been made good, and cannot he. It hangs, like a
stuffed unicorn from a sky-hook, upon a concept of subjectivity as
absolute, as Barthes makes clear in his pronunciamiento that
... a text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning
(the 'message' of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space ... It
This is approximately as illuminating, in the world of letters, as an
agriculturalist informing an assembly of farmers that an onion is not
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a pear, but rather a juicy orb of acrid skins. The idea that texts have
'single' meanings has never been entertained by anybody other than
'deconstructionists' themselves. Theory proposes, and then disposes;
and those who inhabit the flying island of Laputa are able to feel that a
light has come into the world Perhaps it is time we should recognise
that onions and tomatoes really are not pears; and that the ceiling of
the Sistine Chapel categorically does not portray The Amorous History
of Noddy and Big Ears. Likewise, no-one has ever reputably equated
authors with God, or their works with Divine Law-not even in the
comparatively absolutist tradition of French literature, as Stendhal
himself reveals:
Un roman est comme un archet, la caisse du violon qui rend les sons,
c'est l'ame du Iccteur. t2
Stendhal's 'arne du lecteur' supposes, as milch in France as in
England, a communion of like and unlike minds shaping over time the
perception of works of art; so that the extravagance of the Barthesian
claim is a function of its dissociation from everything but theory; and
its acceptance is commensurate with its never being put to the test. It
is therefore necessary to say that the author or subject has not been
disposed of, for 'deconstruction' has simply never grappled with him.
A sense of inadequacies such as these is bound to issue in a
redressal, or a reaction; as is the discernment of 'deconstruction's'
tendency to seek a merely aestheticizing disengagement from
experience-a tendency and impulse characterized by a recent
commentator as a
... mystificatory detachment ... a textualization of reality, a textualization
of the text, a free play of language [whereby] all texts are escape routes,
bridges thrown across the flowing currents of history-substitutive
satisfactions ... [through whose indulgence] the complex changing
conditions of reality and its dialogic interplay ... the struggle and clash
and collision of ideas and arguments, the difficult logic that demands a
dialectic of response, are ignored, subsumed and absorbed into the
'universalizing' forms of the writer's 'literary consciousness' ... 13
One might well have objections to this Marxist critic's unduly
doctrinaire sense of the determinative bearings of 'reality' on literature;
but the recollection of those bearings, in an atmosphere in which the
indulgence of a theoretical appetite as an end in itself has become too
much a part of modern intellectual life, is salutary. Thus, the tendency
of some literary thinkers toward a 'new historicism' which would
seek to restore to the notion of 'text' the implied one of 'context' is,
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I think, desirable in principle; and certainly the reputation which has
accrued to such names as Barrell and Greenblatt arises, it seems to
me fair to say, not only from tllose writers' merits but also from the
fact that those merits are evinced in response to an hiatus in the
understanding of literature.14 The importance which 'new historicist'
criticism has attained in recent years, and something of the nature of
its undertaking, are suggested in the following observations by a
writer of that persuasion, Marjorie Levinson, to whose view of
Wordsworth's poetry most of tlle remainder of this essay will be
devoted:
A new word is abroad these days in ... scholarship--'historicist'-and
the adjective carries distinctly heterodox overtones. What is thereby
refused is an idealizing interpretive model associated with [deconstruction1
... At the same time, historicist critique distinguishes its interests and
method from historical scholarship, or from '" a numher of works
[which] .. ' position themselves as demystifications of Romanticist readings
as well as of Romantic poems. They use history, or sociopolitical
reconstruction, to resist the old control of Yale. However, insofar as
they repudiate the empiricist, positivist concept of historical fact .,.
these works are deeply of the devil's party. IS
To be able to sail from between the Scylla of 'deconstruction'
and the Charybdis of what Marjorie Levinson calls 'historical
scholarship', into tlle waters of a new and truly 'heterodox' sense of
what constitutes the creative undertaking, would he no small feat.
The initial misgivings aroused by the author's rather too freely
triumphant invocation of the heterodoxy of the I new historicism' are,
however, prompted into something like active suspicion when her
repUdiation of orthodox assumptions is seen to hang not only upon
a reinvention of 'tlle empiricist ... concept of historical fact' so
inimical to tlle Wordsworthian understanding of consciousness, but
also upon a characterization, or demonization, of the non-empiricist
outlook as belonging to 'tlle devil's party'. Specifically, one begins
to suspect that Scylla and Charybdis may in fact be the underwriters
of the Levinsonian vessel, and that, in its helmsman's fear of shores
on which imaginative devilry grins at empiricist ortllodoxies, its
course may be headed very steadily toward certain narrow and
overly-frequented harbours. And I use this metaphor, with its implicit
appeal to the wholeness of the Homeric geography of consciousness,
with the intention of saying that what is needful to modern intellectual
life, and indeed to modern life tout court, is a pact with that 'devil's
party' and its supposedly Satanic instigator. The old conformity, the
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orthodox notion of consciousness, whose prayer-beads run from the
Alpha of an all-sufficient and exalted Reason to the Omega of an
expulsion into the abyss of all that does not square with Reason
alone, is of course the thing which sets its blind face against that
necessary pact. Thus is produced a 'deconstruction' whose pursuit of
imaginative freedom hangs upon nothing less than a dialectic with a
simultaneously deified and demonized absolute rational will. When,
however, in response to the shortcomings of that movement, the 'new
historicism' offers redress through an allegiance to an empiricism
which it touts as a standard precisely of heterodoxy, the suspicion
becomes a near-certainly that what is imminent is yet another rehearsal
for the final guillotining of the subject, and that, in the present tenor
of consciousness of our civilization, little more can be expected than
the reiteration, even among the most confidently 'new' of its
intellectuals, of old half-truths which represent, but cannot address,
the nature of our bedevilment.
Marjorie Levinson's investigation of Tintem Abbey, in which one
might have hoped to see the poet's understanding brought fruitfully
into relation with the objects of his understanding, indicates almost
from its outset that, in its author's need to assimilate the 'deconstructive'
outlook upon literature, the rediscovery of the hors-texte will be
analogous to that of a rediscovery of Nature in the form of Indians in
circus-cages, to be gazed upon, forced to perform, and never released.
Thus, as is frequently the case with reactions, a great deal of what is
basic to the system (and 'deconstruction' is precisely that) whose
defects have become patent, is brought forward and merely
reformulated in the new dispensation. In respect of this process, there
is in the essay in question not only an evident debt, through the
employment of terms like 'textual space', 'textual maneuver' [sic],
and 'representational strategies',16 to the conceptual apparatus of
'deconstruction', but also, and more importantly, the appearance in an
inverted or etiolated form of several of the basic tenets of that
philosophy.
Thus, the author suggests very early on that
... the poem's developmental psychology serves a primarily extrinsic
remedial intention: the de- and reconstruction of the scene of writing t7
and the question is then raised as to whether the poet's failure to
portray in this work the ruined abbey represents
... a determined refusal to let fact supplant fancy, to let the picture of the
place usurp the picture of the mind?t8
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The answer to that enquiry, which has arisen from the abbey's
having been a dwelling-place of the poor and a silent witness to the
evils of an incipient industrialization of the region, would seem to be
given in some sort in this critic's hazarding that she
... would not say Ihal Tinlem Abbey looked very differenl in 1798 Ihan
il had in 1793; it just looked different to Wordsworth in the different
political context of 1798. 19
It is not my intention to discuss here either Wordsworth or his
verse, tempting though it be to delve into the poetic expression and
conditions of what is plainly being sketched here as a classic
'deconstructive' aporia. For my focus must remain on the relation
between an author and a work of art. Marjorie Levinson's attempt to
return 'history' to our sense of the genesis of a poem and the workings
of a writer's imagination, pursued as the project is through a rigorous
and often very subtle argumentation, nonetheless rests in the end upon
conceptual bases of both the crudest and most brittle kind, in which
the assumptions of rationalism appear time and again alongside the
author's allegiance to empiricism. She refers at one stage to the
poet's 'Cartesian problematic' ;20 but to my mind, the victim of that
affliction is not Wordsworth, but his critic. To speak, as she does, of
'the difference between an object and an object of knowledge'21 is to
betray in the clearest of terms her debt to the sire of rationalism, a debt
continuous with her distinction between the '[act' which Wordsworth
refused and the 'fancy' in which we are to suppose he sheltered. For
what precisely is or was or could be 'the picture of the place' entirely
dissociated from 'the picture of the mind'? Since pictures arc inevitably
pictures of something, just as histories are accounts of events, and
therefore proceed in both instances from a beholder, what representation
of a place or a person or a time has ever issued from a perceiving
intelligence without being in some sort a simultaneous representation
of that intelligence, and thus a 'picture of the mind'? The 'fact', or as
it is expressed elsewhere, 'the concrete social relations' ,22 the miseries
of dispossession and vagrancy, whose existence this critic tells us it is
the undertaking of the poem to efface, are therefore assumed to be
something to which the human mind has unmediated access-a
supposition which even the etymology of the word' fact' invalidates,
since a 'fact' is a thing done or made, and thus itself an 'object of
knowledge', an entity bearing the imprint of a doer or a percciver.23
The notion that creative intelligence could ever register and reproduce
without taint a thing as it is in itself and to itself (which condition is
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inherently unknowable, anyway, and hence unverifiable) rests upon
two impossible postulates: the first, that this consciousness would be
entirely passive, and so unable to generate through its activity any
heat that should transform the object impinging upon it; and secondly,
that it would be wholly transparent and even substanceless, and thus
be capable through its vacuity of attaining with its object an identity
so complete as to be filled with it to entirety. In such a case, the mind
in question could never come to awareness of what had possessed it;
since to renect upon it, as the literal meaning of that infinitive indicates
and the subsequent preposition specifies, that consciousness would
have to contain energic matter (as it were) which should cast light
upon its occupant and in some sense transfigure it The entirely
receptive intelligence, having before been all diaphanous, and now
become unrelievedly dark, would simply cease to exist.
The perception of a 'fact in itself by a mind entirely subsumed
into its own rational motions is, then, an impossibility. This is not to
suggest, however, that the recognizably Enlightenment suppositions
which produce the ideation of Marjorie Levinson's essay are not of
significance both in terms of what T. S. Eliot calls a 'dissociation of
sensibility' in modern consciousness,24 and as a mainspring in the
manufacture of that species of art which under the denomination of
social realism, defines for our time the essentials of machine-like
purposefulness, of stiltedness and banality. To kill wolves is also to
slay the angels; or, to put the matter otherwise, to adduce as mere
'fact' a reality which the mind itself has in part created, implies a
concept of mind as a deified mechanism, and therefore of all that is
unassimilable to that mind as 'deeply of the devil's party'-a notion
which leaves poetry, as the very least, in a quandary. And thus this
critic, intent on the iglluS fatuus of a Tintern Abbey that did not look
different in itself or as a fact, but only seemed different to a poet
because of changed political circumstances, reaches, inexorably one
feels, the conclusion that
... Wordsworth learns to sever his interests from history ... and to align
them instead with poetry, a safer investmenl.25
What precisely is meant by that dichotomy the author goes on to make
explicit. For having recoTlstructed
... the fact of Tintem Abbey-its evidence of poverty and pollution and
above all its memorial to an extinct form of social existence yearned for
by the poct,26
she is able to elaborate upon and pursue her argument that
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'" the narrator [of the poem] achieves his penetrating vision through the
exercise of a selective blindness ... (Wordsworth] ... excludes from his
field certain conflictual sights and meanings-roughly, the life of things;27
which proposition is reiterated throughout the essay, as in the statement
of our being bound
'" to see that Wordsworth's pastoral prospect is a fragile affair, artfully
assembled by acts of exclusion.28
The darker powers, traditionally, arc artful; and thus does the
'poetry' dissociated from 'history' recommend itself to us as the
outcome of a species of sublime funk-as a 'safer investment'
significant of an artistic consciousness working through the means of
'exclusion' for the attainment of what is referred to elsewhere as 'the
charm of thought' .29 Nowhere in this essay docs its author indicate
even the beginnings of a recognition that a poem which achieves a
'penetrating vision' cannot do so as the reward, as it were, of that
reprehensible shirking of ugly experience, that abdication of creative
responsibility implicit in the idea of 'thought' as something clzanning-
an abdication unintentionally expressed by the critic herself as
'" the transformation of reflective into reflexive thought ... The idea is to
install psychically a mechanism such that incoming dala arc ... purged of
conllictual (unconsecrated) particulars.30
Here, then, is the machine; and the clumsy purposefulness of the
installation envisaged is entirely consistent with the metamorphosis
of Marjorie Levinson's immutable Facts into the mere fodder of a
species of computer. That substance, having once undergone its
h~matidrosis, may then be made to figure as a 'penetrating vision'
that begins increasingly to look like the modesty of a very prepossessing
trollop. For this essay is impotent throughout to suggest what it is that
positively constitutes the poem it fails to discuss; so that what the
invoked 'penetrating vision' and 'charm of thought' actually do as
poetry is a matter not condescended to, the author preferring instead
consistently to imply that the poem, in its eschewing of Fact for a
'safer investment', distinguishes itself through its expression of
Transcendence. This manifestation of the Eliotic dichotomy between
thought and feeling, attributed by tJle critic to Wordsworth but
pertaining rather to her own Benthamite assumptions, is an interesting
case of the easy cohabitation of ideological and scholarly rigouf with
mere sentimentality-for it is to the satisfactions of sentimentality
that the critic's statement of her methodological undertaking and her
objectives seems decidedly to aspire. She writes that one
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... wants to find a use for [Romantic transcendence). I believe that the
way we do this today ... is to refuse the transcendence until such a time as
we can trace its source and explain its character. Then we too are liberated;
we share in the poets' ecstasies ... 3t
The impulse behind Romantic poetry, it would now appear, is to
become 'liberated'; though of course the sublime prospect which that
condition affords to bards and critics alike will be refrained from by
the more scrupulous latter until science and exegesis shall discover its
origins outside the poem-the origins which subsist in the 'facts' of
history and biography, and which, once seized, will yield to the
investigator not only those temporarily forfeited 'ecstasies' but also
the key to the work's mythology. In this instance, however, the critic
has built so heavily on the existence and immanence of what she
herself calls 'the tyranny of fact' ,32 as well as on an implicit concept
of perception as an immaculate and unimplicated medium, that if it
can once be shown that such premises are unsustainahle, her thesis
must collapse. I believe that I have already demonstrated this; but
some further observations are now in order.
For even were human intelligence able to apprehend things as they
are in and to themselves, and could do so in autonomy from the
linguistic means which make them, one might say, of the body of
individuals and cultures, one could still never speak of them without
instantly venturing onto the terrain of the problem as to the observed
and the observer-without becoming, in other words, a subject and a
beholder, and thereby a participant in the evolution of the purcha'ie of
cultures on reality. The sequestration in this essay of fact from fiction,
as it were of clockwork from chaos, apparatus from infernal regions,
itself represents an excursion into the fictitious. The 'fact' which is an
action, a deed, and the 'fiction' which, at least in its root sense, is a
more specific shaping or moulding,33 represent not a dichotomy but
rather, like Apollo, Athena and the Furies, distinct aspects of a
continuum; for since the term 'fact', like any other term, does not
draw upon itself the tangible properties of objects or the lineaments of
deeds, as it were to substantiate itself in the attrihutes of nature, it
cannot be held directly or essentially to signify those attributes-as
the word 'attribute' itself makes plain. 'Fact' is attributive: it bestows
factuality on the perceived, and expresses the recognition (the knowing
again, the shaping anew) of objects by subjects. It therefore represents
a type of human creativity; and the distinction which we maintain
between it and 'fiction' is an act of human perception in which the
knowledge of their relatedness remains implicit-a relatedness which
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evinces itself in our recognition that nature attains in fiction a greater,
but never an absolute, autonomy.34
The burden of Marjorie Levinson's thesis is that what is most
essential and even most real in the poem it examines is precisely what
that poem excludes from utterance or contrives within itself to efface.
In her own words, 'what [it] depicts is less interesting than the
subject thereby overwritten' .35 The work is thus a kind of engaging
address to an inherently more significant reality undergoing burial,
an elaborate and prolonged instance of what 'deconstruction' calls an
aporia; but her indebtedness to this concept and its implied aesthetic
is coupled with another to a philosophy superficially incompatible
with that of Derrida and his followers. For her essay's sense of 'fact'
is straightforwardly deterministic: Wordsworth ought, the implication
surfaces again and again, to have written about the poor; about
pollution; and about the human consequences of the Industrial
Revolution and the enclosure of the common land\); because these
things are Social Realities. His poem, in eschewing all these and
presuming to contemplate a more intimate series of problems, is
thus a 'safer investment'-{)fie which achieves the feat of being at
once a 'massive imagination'36 and something 'less interesting' than
Reality: which Gordian knot of improbability, it is clear, stands as no
impediment to the critic in her scrupulous pursuit of 'ecstasies'. Since
the poet's flight from the thing he dreaded was indubitably (this
scholastic Mrs Merdle having no nonsense about her in such matters)
a flight from Fact, it follows that the substance of his contemplation of
that spot on the Wye must be the representation of afalse consciousness.
The alternative, to which, however, both the poem and reason
persuade us, is to suppose that it is the critic's own enterprise that is
misconceived.
Whether or not Marjorie Levinson's assumptions and their
dissociative and reductive manifestations are attributable to an
unresolved Marxist hankering, or to 'deconstruction', or, as seems
likely, to both, the significant issue, in terms of this enquiry, is that
her essay, even when it would appear to be most at odds with the
explicit dogmas of that latter philosophy, shares their reliance on the
existence of absolute entities. It is therefore compatible with the
psychology-one might call it totalizing-which this dependence
symptomatizes. One might say that Derrida's notion of there being
nothing outside the text is one half of an eggshell, and that her idea
that the fundamental meaning, as it were the SOUl, of a poem, lies not
within itself but in a 'history' which it both excludes and sublimates,
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is the other half; and that between them they make an empty whole.
Precisely in a text written under the almost-palpable influence of
'deconstruction', 'deconstruction's' much-anathematize trallscelldental
signified returns in the most uncompromising form, in the shape of
Jeremy Bentham, who again comes bearing in one hand imagination
or the 'reflexive consciousness', and in the other, his and this critic's
treasure of the heart, the 'social consciousness'.37 It was perhaps
inevitable that the intended overthrow of the Author and the opening
of literature should have resulted, as revolutions invariably result, in
the formulation of an absolutism more comprehensive than the one
previously abhorred-an absolutism, in the first instance, concocted
from shreds and mere implications by Derrida and Barthes and then
hoisted up for execution in the vestments of 'a single 'theological'
meaning'; from which regal scarecrow the stuffing has been dragged
to all quarters and absorbed into the arcane world of literary theory.
Thus artifice has created nature; and the paper innards of a despot who
never reigned in poems or novels have assumed, if not life, then
automation, in the writings of those who subscribe to the notion of art
for theory's sake. What in Ilona BeIl's essay on Donne was a simple
underlying assumption which might have been grist to the
'deconstructive' mill for the manufacture and shredding of omnipotent
father-figures, has become in this later and intellectually much more
sophisticated piece on Wordsworth, which imagines itsclfto be building
on the unpeopled landscape of 'deconstruction', a series of explicit
and absolutizing enunciations. But the life of works of literature, like
the lives of human subjects, derives from their being a mid-term, at
once a reflection and an oracle, both the hidden and the revealed; and
nature, seen as stripped of the duality that enlivens her, must be
rendered to the mind either as pure autonomy, 'deconstruction's' self-
entire tcxtuality, or as absolute exteriority, this critic's self-confessed
sense of a determinative 'immutable fact' .38 Since, however, it has
been demonstrated that the notion of such an objectivity cannot bear
examination, there should be no surprise at its being dragooned into
what amounts on her part to an almost insolent subjectiveness, as
though the empirical world should have inverted itself into rationalistic
world-building pure and simple:
.. , the green lawns, that figure in the poem as an image of psychic and
material well being, are the miserahle product of an economic fact and its
charged history, as are the attractively, 'sportively' sprinkled lines of
hedges, another emblem of enclosure. We can assume, I think, that the
meaning of those hedgerows was available to Word<;worth,39
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What we can assume, it seems to me, is that this critic believes that
meaning as it is deduced by her to exist is quite simply meaning in
itself; and that not only Wordsworth but also the contemporary reader
ought to be docile to the fact The 'meaning' which she imagines she
has grasped like a safely landed fish, struggling perhaps, but indubitably
there from the waters of history, is nonetheless a phantasm, the ghost
of a machine. It expresses not nature or human events but merely her
own doctrinaire thesis that the poem she examines is about everything
and anything other than what in it its author seeks to evoke and
explore-from which it follows that not only the Facts but also the
Meaning of Tintem Abbey are constituted in the exegesis of the
commentator herself. Thus the poet is both 'dead' in the llanhesian
sense, and an absolute negative presence, a demon of sorts, which
creates, as it were, the work from refusals, or from what she terms the
'sublimation of oversight to insight' .40 With these postulates to hand,
the critic is able to burn the candle at both ends, and simultaneously to
lumber onto the poem in the author's absence the material she avows
as its true content, whilst summoning him from the shades to impute
to him the blame for excluding that 'history' for whose exhumation
she would claim the credit Nonetheless, her undertaking represents
not so much boldness as confusion For just as it is impossible to
apprise oneself of the world of objects in its objectivity, or to attain to
a 'massive imagination' and 'penetrating vision' on the basis of
nostalgia and a 'safer investment', so, too, does it involve a certain
sleight of hand to suppose that poetry can be both a blue-print of
authorial consciousness, a 'biography' saturated with intentions either
positive or negative, and so utterly a tissue of subterfuges as to invite
critical intervention for the reconstructing of its truth. In Marjorie
Levinson's view of things, the negative but still personal and 'available'
will of the poet, and the operational evasiveness of Tintem Abbey,
are of course susceptible of interpretation into a formula-version of
reality superior to the poem itself in point of truthfulness, and almost,
it would seem, of virtue; but this stance is not without its problems.
To adduce as the substantiation of Wordsworth's avoidance of an
'impossible reality'41 the biographico-historicalluggage which in the
essay in question all but obliterates the poem, is to reveal the critic's
faith in an assumption which involves her in some uneasy shifting
between concepts of the conscious and the unconscious mind. This
assumption, expressed in the whole tenor of her enterprise, is that not
only is the integrity of the work of art a mere mystijicatioll,40 but that
the negatively blue-printing mind, the consciousness of the poet, is
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something distinct from the poem and able to be deduced from an
exterior (postulated) reality. Hence, in the absence of
... a conscious act of rcconstruction--of the place and the person more--
one must take Wordsworth's impression at face value;43
or, as she puts it, one must 'swallow the poem whole' .44
Such are the possibilities available to those readers unsophisticated
enough to begin to doubt the wisdom of the critical practice of
Marjorie Levinson. The absolutizing impulse capable of envisaging
'immutable fact' likewise descries only two mutually exclusive
responses to the poem: that of total control ('in the day ye eat thereof
.,. ye shall be as gods'),4S or a total absence of enquiry; that of
Wordsworth's interrogator herself, or of a buffoon. The confidence,
however, is misplaced. It supposes, firstly, that the 'conscious act of
reconstruction' will give 'the place and the person' as Fact, (which
impossibility has already been dealt with); and secondly, that this
'conscious act' is capable of translating into its own terms a mind
whose only objective existence for the contemporary reader is in the
poems which proceeded from it and represent it now. The
representation, however, is not a copy, but a thing also in its own
right: 'the person', the mind, conscious and unconscious, which created
it, are gone. This critic, however, is debarred by her lights from
recognizing that 'the material' which the poem 'so consummately
sublimes' is the poem itself; and anything else, biography, history, or
even 'immutable fact', a participant in those actions of the imagination
which she flatters herself to have overleapt,46 Thus, for the prosecution
of her enterprise, she invokes the 'apparatus' (supposedly
recommended in the poem) whereby the author's perceptions are
'preconsciously processed', with the effect that
... the unthinkable, ideology-refusing suggestiveness of the world is
expunged unconsciously, leaving the individual's confidence in the
disinterested holism of his knowledge intact;47
so that it then becomes the critic's business to know and to make
known this exterior and non-poetically immanent unconscious mind.
Let us not pursue here the fact that the project of making the
unconscious an item of intellectual awareness is foredoomed in that
through it the seizure of what one covets entails that very object's
escape: rather as Midas could touch neither food nor drink nor his
daughter, without their becoming the stuff of his ego's craving, so one
can attain not the unconscious in its integrity, but only more and more
consciousness, more and more notional formulations, from that entity
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which in itself cannot be rendered as statement, knowledge, and light
That is a more general point, though pertinent here. Specifically,
however, my objection to this critic's sense of the mind and of poetry
is twofold.
In the first place, Marjorie Levinson conceives of the unconscious
as a biographical and even a biological entity. For her, that unconscious
is not manifest in the poem except as an absence; and the hallmark of
her investigation of Tintem Abbey is the viewing of that work as a
sublime conglomerate of symptoms of 'the material', the mind and
history, presumably more real than the verse, which lie beyond it and
precede it This approach places her in the bind of relying absolutely
for the vindication of her sense of consciousness and of the poem
upon an objective reality which, in the terms whereunder she
contemplates it, can never be shown to exist Thus, like a dog biting
its own tail, are empiricism and rationalism confounded together: an
unconscious which is deduced as an hypothesis from the poem, is
unable to be established and recovered from outside the poem; for
its origins as poetry determine that it can exist and be apprehended
either within and as the verse, or not at all. Otherwise, it would
have to constitute itself as a physical entity. Hence, near the end of
her essay, the critic, as if this difficulty did not exist, speaks of the
poet's 'response'48 to 'reality'; thereby showing that she is at least
consistent in her preconceptions; but also demonstrating in a succinct
form the deterministic and utilitarian allegiances that her essay
proclaims from its outset. The real is there, absolute, monolithic, and
formulable: it is the thing to which poets respond; their art thus
evincing itself as a perhaps especially intriguing and even 'beautiful'
instance of the ungainsayably decorative and secondary. This, one is
bound to reply, is Philistinism-Philistinism elaborated and become
fastidious in exegetical subtleties, but Philistinism all the same: one
which, in the typical manner of that compulsion, seeks to disguise
its contempt for the nature of art beneath the garments of that
most gapingly stupid of idols, the social consciousness. To view
poetry as an objcct without an integrity of its own, a formula to be
decoded and thus 'understood', is to enact a complicity, and a
succumbing, in the project of blank oblivion whereby our civilisation
would cut itself adrift from the needful rediscovery of Lawrence's
'man in his wholeness wholly attending' ,49 the neglect of which is
the constant reproach of our ambition for uninhibited progress.
Marjorie Levinson's allegiance, when all is said and done, is to the
Enlightenment; and one might say that it is in response to his own
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sense of the Enlightenment and its unhappy effects on human life
and knowledge that Wordsworth asks
... For was it meant
That we should pore, and dwindle as we pore,
Forever dimly pore on things minute,
On solitary objects, still beheld
In disconnection, dead and spiritless,
And still dividing, and dividing still,
Break down all grandeur, still unsatisfied
With our unnatural toil, while littleness
May yet become more little, waging thus
An impious warfare with the very life
Of our own souls? Or was il ever meant
That this majestic imagery, the clouds,
'The ocean, and the firmament of heaven,
Should be a barren picture on the mind?50
To Marjorie Levinson, 'the picture of the mind' proffered in verse,
in not heing at once and identically 'the picture of the place',
must, according to what she holds most sacred, inevitahly be this
same Lockean 'barren picture on the mind'. For now, if fl'y a que le
IlOrs-texte. However, Ti"tem Abbey, I would propose, invites us to
a different view.
There is also a second objection to this critic's outlook on poetry
and on consciousness; and it is closely related to the first. Her analysis
has brought us not an inch closer to Wordsworth, but merely to the
possible, and perverse, applications of 'literary theory'. One is led to
conclude that in fact she does not believe in the unconscious she
postulates; that it is a mere means to an end, being introduced as a
kind of recruit to a production-team for the furtherance of her project
of conceptual engineering. The unconscious mind can only be
symbolized in an image, its workings evoked in a metaphor: it cannot
be enunciated in a formula; hut in Marjorie Levinson's account of
the representation of that mind's by-products in a poem, metaphorical
thought is actually pressed into the service of such an attempted
enunciation. Thus, the thing from which Tintern Abbey is fabricated
is a 'mechanism' or an 'apparatus' that cleanses 'incoming data' of
'conflictual particulars': the subjection of the imagination to the
ratiocinative ego's projection of itself as machine and as process
could hardly attain a more explicit characterization. The unconscious
which Wordsworth's investigator claims to acknowledge thus sits
very uneasily with the terms in which she habitually thinks; and one's
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reservations as to its authenticity are confirmed in the realization
that any deep sense in her of its operations would bring her naturally
to envisage the poem as the embodiment of that unconscious, rather
than as the effect of an exterior unconscious posited from the conscious
mind of the critic herself. It is not a simple case, here, of her using the
poem to confirm the reality of an unconscious already believed in:
instead, her commitment both to such an unconscious and to poetry is
token inasmuch as she assumes that the two can be formulated in
terms of their rationally-apprehended 'components'; and that such a
formulation attains a closer union with 'history' and 'reality', and
indeed with Wordsworth's mind, than the poet's own verse is capable
of attaining. Her delineation of the unconscious, in the very terms in
which she would clinch that entity, in fact imputes to Wordsworth
a species of over-consciousness; or at least a pervasive will (and
what is mechanical force and efficacy but an application of the
conscious will?) to repress his own supposed mirror-like reception of
the real, an intention not to imprint as poetry on a page the Facts
imprinted on his mind: the unconscious is simply not there. This
recognition is deepened when one recalls that after all it is scarcely
possible, despite the critic's seeming belief to the contrary, both to
apprehend in its fullness the 'available' or immanent 'meaning' of a
circumstance, (as Wordsworth is alleged to have done in respect of
those hedgerows), and unconsciously to efface that 'meaning' from
apprehension: if the erasure is unconscious, it is so only because the
impression caused by that availability and immanence was not such
as fully to possess the mind of the observer-in which case the
availability was never so 'available', never such a whore; and the
immanence not nearly so irresistible. If on the other hand it is argued
that the repression of this discomfittingly 'available' knowledge is
conscious, one immediately embarks upon the absurdity of
contemplating the mind's refusal to recognize what purportedly it
cannot but admit to recognition: yet given the impossibility of Fact's
being at once fully immanent to awareness and susceptible of
unconscious erasure, this would seem, saving the abandonment of
that all-powerful 'reality', to be the only course open to Marjorie
Levinson. Her recourse to the unconscious in which she has no
credence and which she is powerless to depict, is therefore, one
understands, obligatory. Only through its invocation could she continue
to predicate those meaning-enforcing Facts upon which her thesis
depends; and only by means of its efficacy in processing, shredding
as it were, 'incoming data', could Wordsworth's ability to disregard
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what he regarded be contrived into feasibility. The critic's installation
of the unconscious in her essay and in Wordsworth remains, therefore,
an effect of Reason: her notion of its workings is determined in all
senses by her real allegiance to the conscious and to conscious
intentions. It is therefore unsurprising-though one wonders now
what has become of the poet's 'apparatus' which unconsciously 'so
consummately sublimes' the Real-to read that in her view
... the narrative project of 'Tintern Abbey' is to intenlionalize mailer. and
mailer of fact.51
This is quite of a piece with her earlier attribution to the poet of 'the
exercise of a selective blindness', or with her idea of his 'pastoral
prospect' being 'artfully assembled by acts of exdusion'-a
compositional modus operandi which she describes as 'this production
protocol' .52 Wordsworth's overseer is, consequently, able to 'forgive'
the author of Tintem Abbey his 'response' to history ('if such things
need forgiving'),53 precisely because her preconceptions as to
factuality, consciousness and intention afford her the luxury of holding
him responsible for it, and of doing so absolutely.
The developments in the practice of criticism which this essay
has sought to trace would therefore suggest that the endeavour to
eliminate from discourse the reality of the author is one whose logical
outcome is the attempt to be rid also of the work-to colonise it, as
it were, through the mandate of extrinsic suppositions, in order that
commentators may seem to confer on themselves from the Tree of
Knowledge what they are denied from the Tree of Life. In this scheme
of things, criticism becomes not so much a means of influencing taste,
defining value, and exploring the relations between a work of art and
the life and mind of its time, as an implement for the vindication of
one form or another ofradical idealism. Thus an author may unfailingly
be discovered to be in dereliction of a supposed duty to the imperatives
in vogue, and his work will offer itself as an interesting, or even
charming, but nonetheless damnable, instance of suhservience to a
'dominant interest'; or endorsement of a 'hierarchy of values'; or
failure to take the de rigeur stance as to that thing which currently
goes under the appellation of 'gender relations'. In short, he has not
produced the poem or novel desired. but unable to he imagined, by
the critic. This is surely an intellectual and moral dead end-{)ne to
which the efflorescence of the critical function. and in particular the
pursuit of the self-sufficiency of what is after all only exegesis, bear
abundant and (one must add) unremitting witness.
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The hiatus in literary sensibility-an hiatus which correspondingly
evinces itself in all branches of humane thought-represented in the
claims of 'deconstruction' as to meaning and subjectivity, has not,
therefore, been overcome in the 'new historicism' as witnessed to by
Marjorie Levinson. For what in many ways her essay reveals is the
similitude of those two developments in the thinking of critics. The
motto of both tendencies could well be: A Poem is an Aporia: it is
What It Is Not. This likeness, in my view, is made only the more
striking in the fact that what may seem a fundamental difference
between them bespeaks the underlying sameness. Derrida offers us
Chaos, but one suspended from a much-invoked transcendental
signified; while Marjorie Levinson holds out Adamant, on whose
underside, however, artful and socially insensitive devils are perceptibly
thriving: 'deconstruction' presses on, allegedly without subject,
meaning, or origin, into sheer nihilism; while the 'new historicism'
enacts a regression to the pseudo-certainties afforded in scholarly
externalities and biography. The link, however, is here: for in this
latter tendency the author and the work become, as much as in the
former, properly speaking meaningless. Whether one argues that a
poem is without origin and of entirely indeterminate significance, or
one avows that the same creation is a sublime falsification of a life
and its history, the stance mutually taken toward the work's integrity
is one that would endow the critic with an absolute (and hence
dissolvent) purchase upon it; so that it loses, quite literally, its
individuality, and is subsumed beneath a system of unmistakably
totalitarian bent. The 'new historicist' critic claims to know the life of
an author, and the poem is an effect of the life thus 'known': one's
'knowledge', as from the beginning of time, justifies all excesses.
Furthermore, the assumption held in common is that by means of such
a dismemberment and the exposure of a work's 'secret', one will
arrive at its truth-or at the truth of its non-truth: at its negative but
nonetheless deductible meaning; thereby allowing the critic both to
'forgive' the author, and to exult in the bagsful of cinders stolen from
the gods' back door. This, surely, is yet another twist to the seemingly
inescapable Enlightenment optimism which supposes that truth is to
be got through an investigative dissection of selected parts which will
yield a formulation as to the nature of the whole-the optimism
whereby, paradoxically, we 'break down all grandeur' and wage from
different trenches in the rationalistic landscape 'an impious warfare
with the very life Of our own souls'.
The great divide in modern consciousness, surely, may be said to
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open on the question of the subject The Enlightenment assumes that
it exists, and that it may be known in the terms of intellection; from
which it follows, logically and as an actual historical development,
that it possesses no radical integrity, and may be dispensed with-
liquidated as it were, into infinite interpretability, or flung into the
abyss of the demonic non-empirical. On the other hand, what for the
sake of brevity 1 will call an older and still-persistent Catholic
consciousness (I am not referring here to bclief in the dogmas of the
Church) conceives of subjectivity or selfhood in terms of a final
unknowability, and thus contemplates the individual as in some degree
inviolate. The Age of Reason posits that the subject sees the world
through the activity of cognition; and it is the cogito thus formulated
which affirms to the individual, circularly as it were, that thc awareness
of its own motions is what provides to him the evidence of his
existencc. The cogito, then, tends strongly towards absoluteness: the
subject is defined in terms of his consciousness of himself as subject;
which fragile condition, historically speaking, has served to lead
Western man from one to another of those crises of dispersal and
immobility, of Reason become radical un-reason, of which the first is
the French Revolutioll The tendency which with some licence I have
called Catholic, while touched by this chafing dialectic, is nonetheless
not bound to it; since what it discovers is that both individuality and
the integrity of the self depend for their sustenance upon relational
contingencies; and correspondingly, that the subject is at once a
condition and a fruit of the imagination whereby he envisages the
world Thus, Shakespeare's Cleopatra on Antony:
But if there be, or ever were, one such,
It's past the size of dreaming: nature wants stuff
To vie strange forms with fancy; yet, to imagine
An Antony, were nature's piece 'gainst fancy,
Condemning shadows quite.
(Antony and Cleopatra, Y, ii)
Such might be called the belief of poets. That it is not merely a
dramatist's portrayal of the overwrought mind of a grief-stricken
woman is suggested in Thomas Hardy's notes on style of January
1881, in which he observes the value of
... the Wordsworthian dictum (the more perfectly the natural object is
reproduced, the more truly poetic the picture.) This reproduction is
achieved by seeing into the heart ofa thing (as rain, wind, for instance)
and is realism, in fact, though through being pursued by means of the
imagination it is confounded with invention, which is pursued by the
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same means. It is, in short, reached by what M. Arnold calls 'the
imaginative reason' .54
It is this same 'imaginative reason' which both casts into relief the
respective inadequacies of 'deconstruction' and the 'new historicism',
and proffers itself through its works as a truer representative of the
true. I have already suggested how, in the case of Wordsworth, it is
the poet's own thinking as to perception and integrity that propounds
the most convincing answer to the sense of his work held by Marjorie
Levinson: to those of her persuasion, however, those lines from the
earlier version of The Ruined Cottage would signify merely another
more or less subtle case of evasion or special pleading; to which
objection there is perhaps no better answer than to observe that as one
judges, so one shall be judged. Moreover, the 'imaginative reason' is
a figure of the self in its entirety; and rational thought is not the closed
demesne of the naked or the exotically inverted forms of rationalism.
Therefore if, as one would want to accept, we perceive the world by
means of representations or signs, the fact that a means is involved
signifies both that the representation is something other than the
object perceived-that the means in question is to a certain degree
autonomous from the thing apprehended-and that this representation
is also a representation of something that has an objective existence
beyond the one it is given by means of that sign. Precisely because our
perception of things is not of those things in their essence ('for now
we see through a glass, darkly'),55 but rather through the medium of
signs (which are themselves both objects and representations), a doer
is required: not only does the imagination mould or leaven or make
fictional, so to speak, the world which it takes to itself, it actually
cannot but do so. Johan Huizinga expresses the matter in this way:
Every event (even the very simplest fact) conceived by the faculty of
historical cognition presumes an arranging of the material of the past, a
combining of a number of data out of the chaos of reality into a mental
image.56
It may therefore be said that as subjects we see nothing, but
rather recognize what we see, re-forming the objects of sight in the
imagination. The signified is neither entirely different from the
signifier, nor identical with it In the strictest of senses, to say that we
perceive is fictional; for instead, we apprehend or take things to us:
we apperceive, and in the workings of imaginative representation,
perception becomes truly apperception; which facuIty belongs to
author and to reader alike. For as Hardy has it, and as the ambiguous
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syntax of his final clause here, which invokes both reader and writer,
suggestively avers:
... [t]he appreciative, perspicacious reader will ... by affording full scope
to his insight, catch the vision which the writer has in his eye, and is
endeavouring to project upon the paper, even while it half eludes him.57
To 'catch the vision' of another consciousness by means of 'insight'
is an undertaking as repugnant to the principles of rationalism as it
is to the empiricist view of the world. Precisely in this, however, it
is the beginning of that bargain or pact with 'the devil's party' without
which the project of empiricisms both old and new to regard insight as
the mere oversight of themselves must continue to collude with the
hostility of rationalism to art.
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